سيناريوهات ما بعد اغتيال نصر الله: كيف تتأثر سوريا وتحالفات الأسد؟

The open Israeli operation against the Lebanese Hezbollah raises a series of scenarios and questions about its impact on the Syrian regime, the future of the situation in Syria, and Assad’s upcoming alliances. Although it is difficult to predict in light of the series of surprises in the region, this article is a quick attempt to think about these possible scenarios in Syria.

Hezbollah and the Syrian regime: alliance, overlap, and separation

Hezbollah has played a major role in supporting and assisting the Syrian regime since 2012. Hezbollah’s role in Syria was not limited to direct participation in the fighting. Rather, it was the supervisor of the leadership and training of the Iranian-backed militias in Syria, and in many battles it assumed leadership and planning over the army. order.

Within this broad system of foreign and local militias and official regime forces, Hezbollah contributed to controlling Qusayr and Qalamoun, and its participation extended to all Syrian governorates, with its participation in widespread, systematic violations and crimes therein. In order not to exaggerate the party’s military capabilities, it must be said that it was not able, even with its arsenal. The military regime and its long list of Iranian militias were able to achieve a military victory against the factions of the revolution at the level of Syrian geography. The decline of the regime and its allies began since the beginning of 2015 in Daraa, Ghouta, and Idlib, which prompted the regime and Iran to request Russian intervention, which was able to change the military equation.

Hezbollah’s presence continued even after the end of the battles in these areas, as it has a military supply network, military headquarters, and anchor points, in addition to its involvement in the cross-border drug trade. Hezbollah’s influence extends within the structure of the regime itself, as it supervised the training and leadership of local Syrian militias linked to the regime. Such as the National Defense, Al-Quds Brigade, and others, in addition to the wide overlap of military points, operations, and interests that arose over the years of war with the Assad regime. The party did not often establish new military bases, but rather was active within the regime’s official military bases. Therefore, Hezbollah was established as a supervisor of the supported militias. There is an Iranian military, economic, and logistical network in Syria that is parallel to the regime and overlapping with it at the same time.

The extent of Iranian influence on the Syrian regime should not be exaggerated here, as some discourses claim that Iran and Hezbollah control the regime, while there are limits to this relationship and the extent of Iranian influence, and not to overlook the most important Russian factor in Syria, and the regime’s attempt to rebuild its internal authority and external relations in The stage of Arab normalization with him, where he tries more to prove his independence and get rid of Iranian restrictions or the restrictions of the Iranian image of him.

The Gaza War and then the Lebanon War represent the most important laboratory for the limits of this relationship and influence, and Assad’s ability to play between these alliances and change them.

The impact of the party’s intervention in Syria on its security exposure

Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria had a major impact on its security exposure, in addition to the decline and limited Arab solidarity with it due to its involvement in supporting the Assad regime and its participation in sieges, starvation, displacement, and massacres.

On the security level, the party emerged from closed rooms towards open fronts extending over most of the Syrian geography, and during that time it dealt with tens of thousands of fighters from the Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani Shiite militias, many of whom were recruited because of their economic situation and not necessarily ideological loyalty, which made it possible for control It is almost impossible to leak information about the party, in addition to the party’s daily dealings throughout the years with the regime’s fighters and its notorious, easy-to-penetrate, and corrupt intelligence, in addition to the fighters who defected from the regime’s forces after dealing with party members and leaders and joined the Free Army, which in turn had means of penetration. And espionage against the regime forces and its allies. This extensive and daily interaction with thousands of fighters and open movement over a wide geography was a source of a stream of information about the party, its movements, pictures and names of its members, and its military capabilities.

In addition, the party’s preoccupation in Syria since 2012 has deepened its preoccupation with developing its security confrontation against Israel. Although the party has entered into a truce with Israel since 2006, it has deepened this truce since 2012, as it exhausted its cadres and capabilities in Syria.

It is not possible, of course, to rule out a major Israeli hack or information leak that occurred recently, as the complete security exposure suggests access to the party’s central database, and not just the accumulation of information through open sources or the information of elements from the lower ranks. Conspiracy theories are active here – which cannot be confirmed or denied – About the provision of this information by the Syrian regime itself.

The repercussions of Hezbollah’s strikes on the military situation in Syria

Regarding the military situation of the Syrian regime versus the revolutionary factions in northern Syria, since 2020 the maps of influence in Syria have stabilized due to international understandings, mainly between Russia, Turkey and the United States, in addition to Iran, and these understandings do not appear to have changed due to the impact of the Gaza or Lebanon war, and therefore The assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and the collapse of Hezbollah in Lebanon does not have a direct impact on these maps, and perhaps does not have a negative impact on the regime’s ability to defend its positions within the situation of stability of the front lines. Hezbollah was an effective fighting and training force in times of major raids and battles, supported by Of course, with Syrian and Russian warplanes and a list of auxiliary militias, but it does not represent Rabat’s main force on the front lines today.

On the Israeli side, these intertwined relations between the party and the Syrian regime, and the participation of officers from the regime in the party’s supply chains during previous years, may threaten the spread of Israeli assassination operations into Syria to target these officers or any movement linked to the party, and Israel has included Syria among its threats in Her recent statements were to intimidate the regime and its officers linked to the party from helping it after the rapid collapse of its leaders.

On the Hezbollah side, the strikes the party is being subjected to in Lebanon may push the remaining leaders of its leaders to activate their supply network in Syria, in addition to the possibility of the party’s members withdrawing from Lebanon to Syria and not the other way around. This has an impact on the possibility of Israel’s escalation in Syria. However, it places the party’s members and network more under the control of the regime or facing it if the Iraqi militias decide to confront it.

Israel has been following the tactic of successive and escalating shocks since the pager strike, then the radio bombing, then the assassination of the leaders of the Radwan Force, all the way to the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and an unknown number of military commanders with him on September 27th. These shocks prevent the party from being able to restore military and security confidence and prestige, in the face of Its elements and its incubator before Israel, which contributes to the widespread feeling of helplessness and complete security exposure among the ranks, and in the event of shocks and the collapse of confidence, the lower ranks become likely to collapse and withdraw, and this is one of the goals of the cinematic Israeli escalation and its escalation: preventing the party from the possibility of restoring confidence and pushing the lower ranks towards… Collapse and withdrawal.

Al-Assad’s neutrality vis-à-vis Israel and the Iranian predicament

This development puts Al-Assad’s relationship with Hezbollah and Iran in a dilemma, as Al-Assad has chosen neutrality since the Gaza War on October 7, 2023, and rather since the October 1973 war, and despite his canned speeches, the Assad regime did not possess a doctrine or will to confront Israel in Any time since 1973, as well as developing the possibility of this confrontation.

Assad cannot open a front against Israel even if he wanted to, as the regime’s military bases are open, exposed and known to Israel, and the regime – which has exhausted itself for 13 years in the face of a revolution and popular factions and was unable to defeat them alone – has no experience in confronting massive Israeli military and technical superiority. In addition to the rampant corruption in its structure, which made hacking and selling information easy even for local rebel groups, as well as state intelligence.

Although limited fire and missile attacks have occurred towards the occupied Golan since October 7, 2023, these operations were not the work of the regime, Hezbollah, or the Iranian-backed militias, but rather were responsible for them by armed groups outside his control and knowledge, which prompted him to impose a second settlement. In Quneitra, a series of meetings were held between security officers, notables, and civil groups in the region, and an escalation took place against several towns in which local opposition groups remained, to control the security situation and prevent the recurrence of these incidents.

Al-Assad combined with the expected military neutrality, reducing the intensity and intensity of his diplomatic and media rhetoric in support of the “resistance.”“He avoided supporting the Hamas movement or mourning its leaders who were assassinated by Israel, and this led to doubts about his affiliation with the movement. “Axis of resistance“ I have an incubator “Axis“This prompted Iran and Hassan Nasrallah to defend neutrality “The Syrian front“ In their speeches.

It is not expected that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon, and the killing of the leadership ranks of its ally Hezbollah, will change the situation of the Golan Front, as Assad considers that his guarantee of calm on the Golan Front during a year of war qualifies him more for Arab and Western normalization with it and its international rehabilitation, and the collapse of Hezbollah will push him. To further emphasize this guarantee against all other fronts of the Iranian axis.

Al-Assad is also betting on receiving the displaced Lebanese to be another gateway to receiving economic support, international normalization with him, and negotiations to lift sanctions against him.

But on the other hand, Iran, which is heading towards a humiliating retreat after the killing of Raisi, then the assassination of Haniyeh, then the liquidation of Hassan Nasrallah and the leadership of Hezbollah, finds itself in a more critical situation in the face of the regime’s neutrality and the possibility of it benefiting from this neutrality in winning alliances and international relations outside its policy and axis, and in At the same time, Assad represents a guarantee for the Iranian presence and its militias in Syria.

At this crucial moment in the existence of the Iranian axis, Assad is in a better position to get rid of Iranian restrictions on him, impose his own conditions on Iran, and turn his neutrality in the war into economic and political gains.

But this gain for Assad and Iran’s submission to the new position also depends on the absence of a shift in the Iranian position on the regime, or the discipline of the Iraqi and Lebanese militias deployed in the capital, Damascus. The occurrence of chaos in Syria by causing unrest between these militias and the Syrian regime may be one of the weak but possible scenarios for mixing cards and exaggerate the extent of the chaos in the region caused by the Israeli escalation in Lebanon, where any threat to the stability of the regime represents Western fears of a leakage of its military reserves or huge waves of refugees and another state of chaos that cannot be controlled, especially since any threat to the regime’s control would be a green signal to the revolutionary factions in northern Syria. Or anti-regime groups within areas under its control for an easy advance towards Damascus.

Features of this stage: Iranian hesitation, Israeli brutality, and Arab absence

With the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and the comprehensive military campaign on southern Lebanon and the request to dissolve Hezbollah, Israel raised the level of the Iranian response to return to the deterrence equation towards the level of direct war between Iran and Israel, which Iran has so far shown no desire or audacity to move towards.

After the liquidation of a heavy percentage of Hezbollah’s first leadership ranks and its military stock, the path to Israeli ground intervention appears to be paved, and Lebanese Hezbollah could turn into an “ISIS” model after its leadership was liquidated by the international coalition: scattered groups that communicate with difficulty with their leadership and can implement… Sporadic strikes without a central war organization.

The widespread Israeli war on southern Lebanon after the genocide in Gaza represents international acknowledgment of a period of unrestrained Israeli brutality in the region, and another absence of Arab effectiveness. Israel has liberated itself from the red lines or previous balances, and raised its – realistic – threat to the possibility of doing anything anywhere, as Netanyahu himself says, so what prevents him from going towards the West Bank, Jordan and Egypt in one way or another at a later stage?

The Hamas movement and Hezbollah were part of the political equation in the region, despite the classification of their military – and sometimes political – wings as terrorist organizations by states, and the move to completely liquidate them opens the door to liquidating sub-state actors in the region, whether by Israel or others. This Israeli approach appears to be In line with the Arab normalization movement with Assad as well, where the discourse of dealing with the “state” and not with factions or groups below the state appeared, which puts before the Syrian political opposition, the National Army, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham a big question to evaluate the possibilities of survival and effectiveness in any upcoming scene. Whether Assad was able to win his bet to benefit from the current situation, or whether surprises occurred, none of which are imaginary or unlikely after the many surprises that the region experienced from October 7, 2023 until September 27, 2024.